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Abstract: This paper questions the continued existence of prerogative as a 
meaningful juridical category within UK constitutional law. It constructs a concept 
of prerogative out of canonical definitions, themselves instructive but incomplete, at the 
core of which is the idea of prerogative as a special category of executive power that 
evokes a special authority to which other political agents ought to defer. In light of recent 
prerogative cases, the paper advances two possibilities. A moderate reading suggests that 
prerogative has now become a special category of executive power that may evoke a 
special authority to which the court may in appropriate cases defer. A stronger 
reading advances the idea that prerogative is no longer a special category, but rather an 
inchoate set of executive capacities to which deference in general terms ought not to be 
given. It concludes by suggesting that we need to update our conceptual vocabulary. Just 
as we now speak about the executive’s general administrative powers of contract and 
agency, we should prefer the terminology of the general executive powers of government 
to the vocabulary of royal prerogative. 
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 2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There are more important sources of political authority, but prerogative may still 
represent the apotheosis of executive power. Parliament has successfully chipped 
away at prerogative powers for centuries and the courts have done much to bring 
them further into the constitutional fold. Since there has been no wholesale 
abolition of prerogative, to suggest the end of prerogative may seem foolhardy in 
the extreme But it is just this line of inquiry that this paper proposes. Prompted by 
a quartet of UK Supreme Court cases that question the extent to which prerogative 
can still be said to operate as prerogative, it pursues as a kind of thought-experiment 
the proposition that what we are witnessing may not be the continued declension 
of prerogative so much as its incipient demise.  
The more that argument succeeds, the more it diverges from previous analysis 
of the subject, including my own, which observed attempts by the courts in 
particular to normalise prerogative while noting the deference to government that 
still characterised prerogative cases. While the prerogative might be ordinary in 
principle, it remained special in practice.1 What is apparent in the more recent 
jurisprudence is the almost complete absence of deference afforded to the category 
by the courts. So emptied, prerogative begins to look like any other executive power, 
especially since the national security terrain on which it often presents is increasingly 
subject to scrutiny by courts and other institutions on something close to ordinary 
principles. Indeed, pleading prerogative might even have the opposite effect from 
the one intended, putting the court more on guard than it otherwise might have been. 
Far from being the trump card it may have been once, prerogative may now be 
something of a liability for those charged with defending governmental action.  
There is value in pressing this case. But I also offer a fall-back position that 
accepts the continued existence of prerogative as a distinct, formal source of 
authority but tries to make sense of it given the demystification that has occurred in 
respect of both the prerogative category itself and the substantive claims for special 
powers in the interests of salus populi with which it was once conjoined.  
Either alternative rests on assumptions about public law method. To get the 
argument going, I put both on the table now. The first assumption is that conceptual 
analysis in public law cannot just be about legal doctrine. Public law concerns how 
state power is instituted and exercised. To study a public law concept requires an 
account not just of what judges and jurists have said about it, but also an account 
of how what they said fits within the broader juristic framework of constitutional 
politics. It involves questions of jurisdiction but also of justification. Certainly, this 
                                                      
1 Thomas Poole, ‘Judicial Review at the Margins: Law, Power and Prerogative’ (2010) 60 University of 
Toronto Law Journal 81. See also, from a slightly older vintage, Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), 83: ‘That the courts are prepared to grant to the Crown such elastic 
and ill-defined powers, and to subject their exercise to such modest – even superficial – review, 
constitutes the second way in which the executive will find the rule of law a much less onerous check 
on its powers than it might at first have seemed.’ 
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is true of prerogative. A longue durée concept,2 prerogative is associated with 
sovereign capacities – war and peace, foreign relations, and empire – and touches 
on fundamental questions about trust and the generation of political authority. To 
read only the cases is to miss much of what is important about the concept.  
The second assumption is that this style of conceptual analysis tends to take 
the form of a conversation between the present and the past. Most public law 
argument is situated, adopting an internal point of view to its subject. It may be 
more or less normatively committed, but its concern is with this political community 
and the ragbag of institutions, processes and norms – or what passes for 
constitutional wisdom – that makes it what it is. This is not nativist dogma – one 
can adopt an internal point of view without necessarily being an insider or 
participant.3 Nor does it devalue the contribution of comparative or more general 
philosophical inquiries, not least because these living traditions of thought and 
practice are not hermetically sealed and inspiration can be drawn from many 
sources. It is merely to observe the traditionality of much of what we do, our 
imbrication within juridical structures that ‘involve the authoritative presence of 
transmitted, real or purported past’.4 Other things being equal, public lawyers have 
a responsibility to cultivate the juristic tradition in which they operate. Their 
enterprise is a species of practical reason that entails the refraction of received 
juristic material in light of the concerns of the present.   
 
 
 
II. THREE CONCEPTIONS OF PREROGATIVE 
 
I suspect I am not alone in finding the usual definitions of prerogative deficient. 
There must be something in them for us to go back to them so often. But the 
intuition developed in the first part of the paper is that each definition identifies an 
important aspect of prerogative but does not manage to capture the essence of the 
whole. I intend to sift through these conceptions in order to derive what I call a 
central case of prerogative, which I later hold up against current practice.5 This 
process of exposition, criticism and recovery – of disassembling key parts of the 
existing conceptual apparatus in order to reassemble them more satisfactorily – is 
somewhat stylised, and may entail drawing sharper contrasts between certain 
positions than a more orthodox textual treatment might allow.  
When speaking about prerogative we tend to remark first on how difficult it is 
to pin down – ‘a term which has caused more perplexity to students than any other 
                                                      
2 For a defence of the study of which in the discipline of the history of ideas see Jo Guldi and David 
Armitage, The History Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
3 See Scott J. Shapiro, ‘What is the Internal Point of View’ (2006) 75 Fordham Law Review 1157, 1158-61. 
4 Martin Krygier, ‘The Traditionality of Statutes’ (1988) 1 Ratio Juris 20, 21; Krygier, ‘Law as Tradition’ 
(1986) 5 Law and Philosophy 237, 240. 
5 For an elaboration of this method of sifting – and its application on a much more ambitious scale – see 
e.g. Alan Brudner, Constitutional Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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expression referring to the constitution’,6 Dicey wrote – and on the incense-laden 
air of sanctity that surrounds it.7 It is as if we feel compelled to undergo ritual 
obeisance at the threshold of Blackstone’s altar of the bona dea8 before moving on 
to questions of substance. We now perform this ritual self-consciously and semi-
ironically,9 a display of worldliness that only partially convinces, and I suspect that 
the numinous quality is part of the central case of prerogative.  
Genuflection performed, our navigation of prerogative generally involves the 
interplay of three canonical statements or conceptions. These are more at variance 
with each other than we sometimes assume. In this game of competing definitions, 
it is Dicey’s that predominates. He describes prerogative as ‘the remaining portion 
of the Crown’s original authority’ and therefore ‘the name for the residue of 
discretionary power left at any moment in the hands of the Crown, whether such 
power be in fact exercised by the King himself or by his Ministers’.10 While 
illuminating in certain respects, the definition is incomplete. For one thing, it does 
not distinguish prerogative from third-source power,11 but perhaps there is no real 
difference between them.12 More importantly, it does not get us much beyond the 
genuflection stage,13 though it does go some way towards describing the space in 
which prerogative operates. What it does usefully express, as I explain, is the idea of 
prerogative as a symbol. We can draw from Dicey the proposition that prerogative is 
essentially the residue of royal authority. It is a special sort of power that draws on 
the traditional or charismatic authority in principle embodied in the King.14 
‘Between “prerogative” and “privilege” there exists a close analogy’.15  
                                                      
6 A.V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ed. J.W.F. Allison, 2013), 188. 
7 Lord Roskill said that with prerogative he could hear (quoting Lord Atkin in United Australia Ltd v 
Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1, 29) ‘the clanking of medieval chains of the ghosts of the past’: Council of 
Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 417. 
8 Blackstone, Commentaries I.7, 230. 
9 I go on to argue that we are inclined no longer to do it at all. See e.g. Lord Carlile v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2014] UKSC 60, [150] (Lord Kerr): ‘Although we must accord the Secretary of State’s 
view on this issue due deference, we are not required to genuflect in its presence.’ And that the 
prerogative with no trace of residual majesty is no longer really prerogative.  
10 Law of the Constitution, 189. 
11 Law of the Constitution, 189: ‘Every act which the executive government can lawfully do without the 
authority of an Act of Parliament is done in virtue of its prerogative.’ 
12 Although the ‘general administrative powers’ of the Crown were recognised authoritatively in R (New 
College London) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKSC 51, [28] (Lord Sumption). See also 
R v Secretary of State for Health, ex p C [2000] HRLR 400 (CA); Town Investments Ltd v Department of the 
Environment [1978] AC 359. Much of the day-to-day business of government falls under such powers, 
which include the power to form contracts to the power to convey property, and powers to circulate 
written material, consult with officials, give gifts, and create policies. For discussion see Bruce Harris, 
‘The Third Source of Authority for Government Action’ (1992) 108 Law Quarterly Review 626; Adam 
Perry, ‘The Crown’s Administrative Powers’ (2015) 131 Law Quarterly Review 652. 
13 Lord Reid made a similar criticism in Burmah Oil Company v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75, 99, saying that 
Dicey’s definition ‘does not take us very far’. 
14 On which see e.g. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: An Essay in Medieval Political Theology 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Kenneth Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600: 
Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
15 Law of the Constitution, 190. 
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We need to handle this insight carefully. Dicey noted how this authority had 
moved away from its original source. He always connected the prerogative of his 
day to the abstract entity of the Crown16 and not, as Blackstone tended to do, to the 
person of the monarch. He also said that those prerogative ‘powers now left in the 
hands of the Crown’ are ‘exercised in fact by the executive government’.17 And he 
acknowledged that the executive officers of government, while formally the Queen’s 
servants, in fact derive authority from a different source. As he wrote, in a discussion 
of conventions, ‘[t]heir end is to secure that Parliament, or the Cabinet which is 
indirectly appointed by Parliament, shall in the long run give effect to the will of 
that power which in modern England is the true political sovereign of the state – 
the majority of the electors, or (to use the popular though not quite accurate 
language) the nation.’18 
This is the background against which we must interpret the pivotal but elusive 
phrase in his definition where prerogative is defined as the ‘residue of [royal] 
discretionary authority’. Dicey pinpoints the idea of residue as crucial to 
understanding prerogative. But the term can be read more or less expansively. It 
might be read as saying simply, but not especially insightfully, that surviving 
prerogatives operate on a more restricted range than they once did, say under the 
Stuarts.19 I prefer a broader reading that also takes Dicey as saying that in those 
extant prerogatives, we encounter a past world structured according to different 
political imperatives and principles. While prerogative continues to exist in 
attenuated form in the era of representative government and the rule of law,20 this 
reading suggests its true home remains the age of kings. Prerogative is the unpurged 
relic of lordship within our constitutional structures. With it, we come face to face 
with a political model that relied on twin medieval or ‘Gothic’ bases: control of 
territory (warlord) and control of land (overlord).21 This broader reading, which 
makes Dicey much less comfortable with prerogative than he is often made to 
appear, has the merit of bringing his definition of prerogative closer to his hostile 
position on martial law, increasingly prominent in later editions of the Law of the 
Constitution, which denied the executive any special prerogative capacity to declare 
martial law in time of peace.22 
                                                      
16 Martin Loughlin observes that although the idea of the Crown as a legal symbol of public power serves 
to differentiate between an institution of government and the personality of Her Majesty. But our 
related inability to distinguish properly between the State, Her Majesty and the Crown also entails that 
on fundamental issues our law is ‘thoroughly ambiguous’: ‘The State, the Crown and the Law’ in 
Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne (eds), The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 38-39. 
17 Law of the Constitution, 39. 
18 Law of the Constitution, 191. 
19 This corresponds to Sebastian Payne’s interpretation of Dicey on prerogative, which he calls ‘entirely 
descriptive and retrospective’: ‘The Royal Prerogative’ in Sunkin and Payne, The Nature of the Crown, 94. 
20 See Law of the Constitution, 39. 
21 The original (and best) analyst of the Gothic constitution and its structural presuppositions was James 
Harrington: see The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, ed. J.G.A. Pocock, 1992), 53-62. 
22 Law of the Constitution, 161-64 (First Edition) & 352-66 (Sixth Edition). See also David Dyzenhaus, ‘The 
Puzzle of Martial Law’ (2009) 59 University of Toronto Law Journal 1. 
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John Locke provides the second conception of prerogative. His account 
remains idiosyncratic23 and some may cavil about its inclusion here. But we 
frequently return to Locke on prerogative.24 I suspect we do so in part because of 
the canonical status of the Two Treatises of Government and its author’s unparalleled 
reputation among English writers on the liberal constitution. But prerogative also 
provided Locke with a category through which he could explore foundational 
conditions of legitimate rule within the constituted polity, and specifically the nexus 
between (executive) authority and (popular) trust. Though Locke does not provide 
a narrowly legal account of prerogative – for that we would turn to his contemporary 
Sir Matthew Hale25 – his theory is nonetheless juristic in its willingness to articulate 
how the prerogative might fit within the legal, institutional and normative 
architecture of the modern state patterned along English lines.  
For Locke, prerogative was essentially a power to command that operates 
outside and against the laws, extra et contra legem. The Prince, whether monarch or 
republican leadership, holds this power in reserve for use where the laws run out,26 
most notably in times of war or public emergency.27 This account highlights that 
prerogative is to be distinguished by its form and that what is distinctive about it is 
its formlessness.28 It is a reserve power – in contrast to Dicey’s residual power – that 
operates as a kind of shadow to normal legal authority. ‘This Power to act according 
to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law, and 
sometimes even against it, is that which is called Prerogative.’29 What is characteristic 
about prerogative, Locke suggests, is that the agent who exercises it does not derive 
authority to act from the normal legal source (typically statute) or by engaging the 
process associated with that source (typically parliamentary debate and assent). The 
Prince derives this special power directly from his capacity as supreme executive 
agent, drawing on that wellspring of power as need arises, in order to fulfil his 
                                                      
23 Not least in the way it seeks to separate the domestic (‘prerogative’) and foreign (‘federative’) aspects of 
the power: see John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ed. 
Peter Laslett, 1988), II, Chs XII & XIV. 
24 A recent example is Timothy Endicott, ‘Parliament and the Prerogative: From the Case of Proclamations 
to Miller’ (1 Dec 1016, Judicial Power Project). 
25 Sir Matthew Hale, Prerogatives of the King (London: Selden Society, ed. D.E.C. Yale, 1976).  
26 Locke’s account of the scope of this power is, to modern eyes, extraordinarily broad: ‘the Executor of 
the Laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common Law of Nature, a right to make use of it, 
for the good of the Society, in many Cases, where the municipal Law has given no direction, till the 
Legislative can conveniently be Assembled to provide for it. Many things there are, which the Law can 
by no means provide for, and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him, that has the 
Executive Power in his hands, to be ordered by him, as the publick good and advantage shall require’: 
Second Treatise, Ch. XIV, s.159. 
27 It is a remarkable, if little noted, how close this aspect of Locke’s theory mirrors a standard distinction 
in scholastic thought, derived from Roman Law, between imperium, the ruler’s exceptional and ultimate 
authority, which was not subject to law; and iurisdictio, or the ruler’s routine decisions, which remain 
subject to law. On the distinction see e.g. Michael Wilks, The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), 209. 
28 Making a similar point about Locke’s theory, Clement Fatovic talks about the ‘informality of 
prerogative’: Outside the Law: Emergency and Executive Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2009), 52-55. 
29 Second Treatise, Ch. XIV, s.160 (italics in the original).  
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obligation to secure the public interest (salus populi). Prerogative engages, that is to 
say, the Prince’s capacity as guardian of the state – what Cicero called custodes 
patriae.30  
The tendency among common lawyers like Hale had been to carve up and 
classify prerogative into a bundle of particular, bespoke prerogatives, a familiar strategy 
of disaggregation and normalisation.31 Locke’s instincts ran in the opposite 
direction. He wanted to draw attention to what he took to be prerogative’s juridically 
exceptional nature. Locke must have been aware that this approach entailed risks 
for his political project of patterning political association according to settled and 
standing laws structured on a fiduciary relationship between government and 
governed. His chapter on prerogative offers a reflection on the limits of that model.  
He assumes that there must be a space beyond the realm of settled and standing 
laws and that the products of that space must, by definition, take non-legal shape. 
‘Prerogative is nothing but the Power of doing publick good without a Rule.’32 It exists in the 
realm of decision and action – echoes of Carl Schmitt are inescapable33 – as opposed 
to deliberation and coordinated norm-production. Locke, enemy of the late 
Stuarts,34 is naturally alert to prerogative’s dangers. He develops a political-
theological narrative of trial and judgement where the assertion of prerogative tests 
the bonds of trust between sovereign and subject. His radical status is confirmed by 
an embrace of the potential upside of such moments of conflict-pregnant possibility 
that may produce disintegration, but may equally lead to political and spiritual 
renewal. But Locke’s key conceptual insight is that prerogative denotes a legally 
unstructured species of authority that is a necessary and prior condition of rule-
bound civil association. 
The third conception derives from Blackstone, whose name has already 
cropped up in the company of those who highlight the symbolic or affective element 
of prerogative. That is appropriate, for it was not idly that contemporary critics 
called him ‘prerogative lawyer’,35 and he set value on the Gothic dimensions of 
English law and politics.36 But Blackstone also brings out a third element of 
prerogative. Consider this famous passage in the Commentaries, obliquely referenced 
earlier, where prerogative is described as: 
 
                                                      
30 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Re Publica I. XLI. 64 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, ed. 
Clinton Walker Keyes, 1928), 94. 
31 A not dissimilar strategy was also deployed in cases on prerogative from at least the time of Bates’s Case 
(1606) 2 State Trials 371. 
32 Second Treatise, Ch. XIV, s.166. 
33 See in particular Carl Schmitt, Political Theology – Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, ed. George Schwab, 1985). 
34 On which see Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986).  
35 Wilfrid Prest, William Blackstone: Law and Letters in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 144. 
36 Even in the context of prerogative, where he wrote that the ‘limitation of the regal authority was a first 
and essential principle of all the Gothic systems of government established in Europe; though gradually 
driven out and overborne, by violence and chicane, in most of the kingdoms on the continent’ but not 
in England: Commentaries, I, 231. 
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[a] topic, that in some former ages was thought too delicate and sacred to be 
profaned by the pen of a subject. It was ranked among the arcana imperii; and, 
like the mysteries of the bona dea, was not suffered to be pried into by any but 
such as were initiated in its service; because perhaps the exertion of the one, 
like the solemnities of the other, would not bear the inspection of rational and 
sober inquiry.37 
 
There is mocking, sardonic note to this, without question,38 yet it still reinforces the 
now familiar idea of prerogative as tied to the dignity of the King, and his status as 
basileus or imperator.39 But Blackstone relates another essential idea, and this is that 
prerogative is a special type of authority claim. The claim has two parts. First, a claim 
of special power that is a mark of sovereignty – and it is for that reason that 
prerogative is ‘singular and eccentrical’40 – but even so, would not otherwise be 
within the sovereign agent’s capacity to act. Second, a claim of special jurisdiction, 
that is, a power for the sovereign agent to determine whether that exercise of power 
is legitimate.41 As Blackstone elaborated, ‘in the exertion of lawful prerogative, the king is 
and ought to be absolute; that is, so far absolute, that there is no legal authority that can 
either delay or resist him.’42 Note that Blackstone sees both elements I have 
highlighted as of equal importance. On one hand, prerogative is not legally 
unconstrained and must be sanctioned by law.43 On the other, if a prerogative is 
sanctioned by law the Sovereign is largely free to act within lawful bounds as he sees 
fit in the public interest. It is here, in conjunction with this two-headed claim of 
exceptional right, that the reverence that enwraps prerogative – all that wariness and 
unworthiness, 44 the unfathomable numinousness – has real constitutional bite, for 
the ‘very strength of the prerogative lay in its vagueness, for to define was to limit.’45 
It is tempting to see this definition as simply expressing in different language 
Locke’s point about the essential juridical otherness of prerogative. True, there are 
                                                      
37 Commentaries I, 230-1. 
38 All the more so given the unmistakable echo of James I’s divine right defence of prerogative, and the 
secrecy that he thought ought to attend it, which Blackstone quotes in the same passage. See ‘The Trew 
Law of Free Monarchies’, 74-5 and especially ‘A Speech to the Lords of Commons of the Parliament’ 
(22 March 1610), 190-1 in King James VI and I, Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, ed. Johann P. Sommerville, 1994). 
39 Commentaries, I, 235. 
40 Commentaries, I, 239. 
41 See e.g. The Zamora [1916] 2 AC 77 (Privy Council): ‘Those who are responsible for the national 
security must be the sole judges of what the national security requires.’ (Lord Parker at p. 107). 
Although the court went on to reject the Crown’s claim ‘because the [Prize Court] judge had before 
him no satisfactory evidence that such a right was exercisable’ (p.108). 
42 Commentaries I, 243. 
43 Indeed, this is how Blackstone starts the chapter in the Commentaries on the King’s prerogative, 
repeating a claim made in the first chapter about the ‘bounds so certain and notorious’ that protect civil 
liberty from the royal authority: Commentaries I, 230. 
44 See Darnel’s Case (Five Knights Case) (1627) 3 How. St. Tr. 1, 13: ‘We are too wise, nay, we are too foolish 
in undertaking to examine matters of State to which we are not born.’ 
45 Brian Levack, The Civil Lawyers in England, 1603-41: A Political Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1973), 98. 
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connections between the two accounts, but whereas Locke’s theory is primarily 
political – indeed it interrogates foundational questions of obligation, force and right 
– Blackstone’s enquiry is essentially constitutional. Blackstone sees prerogative as 
the special preserve of constitutional grey areas. In as much as it is outside the remit 
of the ordinary law, it stays within the constitution. The prerogative claim revealed 
in the last paragraph remains a claim to intra-constitutional authority rather than 
extra-constitutional action. It operates with the cognisance of the legal constitution 
even if it neither derives its legitimacy entirely from that quarter, nor comes fully 
under its jurisdiction. For Blackstone, prerogative power comes nested within law 
and institutional structures more firmly and squarely than Locke’s theory seems to 
allow. ‘I shall not (I trust) be considered as an advocate for arbitrary power, when I 
lay it down as a principle, that in the execution of lawful prerogative, the king is and 
ought to be absolute’.46 Both writers think that prerogative is essential for a 
functioning political order. But Locke is attracted to what he takes to be 
prerogative’s extra-legal core, a precondition for political existence and the name we 
give to the political space in which basic authority is asserted and tested. Blackstone 
instead takes as defining prerogative’s mediating capacity, regarding its skilled and 
prudential use as essential to preserving the balance of the constitution – or rather 
a series of balances, between law and politics, decision and deliberation, action and 
norm, king and parliament. When ‘balanced and bridled’, he claimed, prerogative 
‘invigorates the whole machine, and enables every part to answer the end of it’s 
construction’.47 
 
 
 
III. THE CONCEPT OF PREROGATIVE 
 
So, what is prerogative? Three conceptions dominate, each suggestive but 
incomplete. The first (Dicey) sees prerogative as a residual power, expressive of the 
old marks of kingship some of which continue to operate in a changed world. The 
second (Locke) expresses an idea of prerogative as a plenary reserve power for use 
by the Prince when the law runs out or obstructs the public interest. The third 
(Blackstone) sees prerogative as a distinct juristic claim to special power and special 
jurisdiction and, revelling in its Gothic pedigree, suggests that the aura that encodes 
prerogative serves a useful function, freeing the Sovereign to act where necessary, 
so as to rebalance the constitution.  
Each conception tends to spotlight a different analytic property. The first 
conception’s idea of prerogative as the patrimony of kings, when played out in a 
constitutional monarchy that is effectively a republic in dress-up clothes,48 ends up 
                                                      
46 Commentaries I, 243 (emphasis added). 
47 Commentaries I, 233. 
48 I suspect that this idea that the UK is a monarchy in name only has been the dominant view among 
students of the UK constitution since at least Bagehot’s The English Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, ed. Paul Smith, 2001). But that perspective already had a long pedigree, a seminal 
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emphasising prerogative’s symbolic or affective aspects. The second conception of 
prerogative as an open-ended power that allows the Prince to act outside law draws 
attention to questions of form, specifically to its (at least relatively) informal nature. 
The third conception, like the first, highlights prerogative as a symbol but it does so 
the better to explain its functional role, understood as engaging a set of 
constitutionally permitted sovereign capacities.  
 
Table 1: Conceptions of Prerogative  
 
 Nature  Figure  Element  
Dicey  Residual  Crown Symbol  
Locke  Reserve  Prince Form 
Blackstone  Discretionary  Constitutional 
Monarch  
Function  
 
 
This is the material out of which I construct the central case of prerogative. By 
‘central case’ I mean more than concentrating on core prerogative capacities (such 
as war and peace, foreign relations, some aspects of citizenship, defence of the 
realm), though this is where my attention is focused. My working premise has been 
that the three authors addressed so far are on to something and deserve to be taken 
seriously. So, I intend to preserve as much as is valuable in the three conceptions, 
especially where they can be said to cohere. Out of that sifting process, I hope to 
identify an account of prerogative that is consistent with core principles of the 
modern constitution. I set down what I derive from that method in propositional 
form.  
1. Prerogative is the name the constitution gives to a specific bundle of executive 
powers:49 those surviving or residual powers that were originally special to the 
                                                      
influence being Montesquieu’s De l’esprit des lois [1748] in which England appears as the epitome of the 
modern republic in which a model of ‘extreme political liberty … is established by their laws’: The Spirit 
of the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller and 
Harold S. Stone), 166. 
49 See e.g. CCSU (Lord Roskill at 417): ‘I am unable to see, subject to what I shall say later, that there is 
any logical reason why the fact that the source of the power is the prerogative and not statute should 
today deprive the citizen of that right of challenge to the manner of its exercise which he would 
possess were the source of the power statutory. In either case the act in question is the act of the 
executive. To talk of that act as the act of the sovereign savours of the archaism of past centuries.’ See 
also Town Investments Ltd v Department of the Environment [1978] AC 359 (HL).  
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king and which engage the executive not in its capacity as executor of the laws 
but in its capacity as guardian of the state (custodes patriae).  
2. Existing conceptions of prerogative share a common root, not fully articulated 
in them, that prerogative is an expression of peremptory or imperative authority.  
The exercise of prerogative typically results in a direction or measure and not a 
law or general norm.50 
3. Whereas with statutes we understand the primary audience to be the legal 
subject, an exercise of prerogative may be said to be first and foremost directed 
at officials.51 It follows that – absent war52 and outside imperial law, both 
contexts where constitutional rules against domination are less clear and less 
consistently applied53 – an exercise of prerogative can have no meaningful or 
lasting effect on legal rights and obligations.54  
4. Prerogative, understood as a mode of peremptory authority, has corresponding 
analytic properties. It is affective in that the style of decisive leadership it sustains 
still draws, albeit sotto voce, upon an ideal of kingly rule. As a residual symbol of 
majesty and lordship, prerogative taps into a sentiment now barely glimpsed and 
almost shameful to modern constitutional sensibilities, but which is probably 
more alive than we care to admit.55 It has a distinctive form in that it dispenses 
very largely with the formal requirements and processes that otherwise mark 
exercises of governmental power. And it has a distinctive function – as a claim to 
a special power and jurisdiction that represents a primary decisionistic element 
within the constitution.  
5. In practice, these properties tend to operate as a complex whole. The weakening 
of one element can weaken the whole. In particular, as the affective part of the 
prerogative diminishes – the direction of travel for a long time – the greater the 
reliance on functional arguments.56 But that move only raises the stakes: why 
                                                      
50 In an early work, Carl Schmitt draws a helpful distinction between measures or decrees, which are 
situation-specific and action-oriented, and legal norms, which aim to give expression to a legal principle 
and are thus general in scope, in discussing the powers of the president of the German Reich under 
Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution: Dictatorship (Cambridge: Polity Press, trans. Michael Hoelz and 
Graham Ward, 2014), 213-17. Prerogative law-making is not unknown, under certain conditions, in 
colonial law – see Bancoult (No.2); Campbell v Hall (1774) 1 Cowp 204 – but again, as a juristic structure 
that maps political domination, this represents the exception that proves the rule.  
51 So, even something on the legislative side of the spectrum – such as the British Indian Ocean Territory 
Order 1965 (S.I. No.1 of 1965) at issue in the Chagos Island cases – is most reasonably read as a set of 
instructions first establishing and then directing the BIOT Commissioner to perform certain functions 
rather than a law directed at the population of BIOT (whose existing was in any case intermittently 
denied by those making the statutory instrument).   
52 Even here, the governing idea is that (a) statute is better (and more normal) as a basis for the actions of 
state agents and (b) while in urgent situations it may be possible through prerogative e.g. to issue 
regulations that may have a provisional force of law, these need to be confirmed by Parliament: De 
Keyser; Burmah Oil.  
53 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Bancoult (No.2) [2008] UKHL 61. 
54 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 5, [50]. 
55 But see Bagehot, The English Constitution, 30 & 41. 
56 See e.g. Endicott’s defence of Blackstone’s well-known articulation of the need for prerogative in the 
field of foreign affairs ‘for the sake of unanimity, strength and dispatch’.  
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choose prerogative when you can accommodate almost any scenario57 within 
the more constitutionally orthodox form of statute plus regulations?  
6. Prerogative operates within ordinary constitutional structures, and these are 
now densely textured with law. But Locke’s point about prerogative’s liminal 
character still has some relevance. Prerogativa regis retains trace elements of the 
constitutionally illicit in that it arguably retains a (greatly reduced) capacity to 
probe the boundaries of the constitution. It is too late to create prerogatives,58 
but the open-textured nature of the category does not entirely preclude the 
possibility that the executive might make creative use of it to the extent that 
other elements within the constitution allowed.59  
 
Table 2: The Concept of Prerogative  
 
 Nature  Figure  Element  
Prerogative  Directive  Executive 
(Custodes Patriae)  
Complex Whole 
 
 
IV. THE PREROGATIVE TWO-STEP REVISITED 
 
The first part of the paper identified a ‘central case’ of prerogative – that is, the 
strongest version of the concept consistent with existing constitutional 
fundamentals – by sifting through existing conceptions. In this second part, 
attention turns to practice. Where possible, the case is pressed that prerogative has 
ceased to function in a way that is consistent with its central case. But by 
concentrating on a number of recent UKSC cases this process of testing proceeds 
in a relatively limited way since a thorough appraisal would necessitate a full survey 
of not only all the relevant cases, but also developments in other institutions, and 
these are only briefly recorded here.  
                                                      
57 This development occurred within the context of both (a) war, (b) emergency powers and (c) martial 
law over a century ago: see e.g. (a) the Defence of the Realm Act 1914 (and subsequent provisions); (b) 
Protection of Life and Property (Ireland) Act (1871); An Act for the Better Protection of Person and 
Property in Ireland (1881); Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act (1883); (c) the creation by statute of a 
Martial Law Board in the Second African (or Boer) War, discussed in Charles Townshend, ‘Martial 
Law: Legal and Administrative Problems of Civil Emergency in Britain and the Empire, 1800-1940 
(1982) 25 Historical Journal 167. For analysis see Thomas Poole, Reason of State: Law, Prerogative and 
Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), ch.6. 
58 BBC v Johns [1965] Ch. 32, 79 (Diplock LJ). But see e.g. the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1843, which 
delegated sui generis legislative (‘as though colonial prerogative’) powers to the Crown with 
extraterritorial utility, intended to give the Crown the prerogatives associated with conquest where 
there was none.  
59 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Northumbria Police Authority [1989] 1 QB 26. A better 
example perhaps of the re-opening of prerogative comes from Australia: Ruddock v Vardalis (the Tampa 
Case) [2001] FCA 1329.  
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With that qualification in mind, let us turn to the law. Contemporary judicial 
review principles relating to the prerogative date from the GCHQ case.60 The case 
involved a challenge to the use of the prerogative by the Prime Minister, in her 
capacity as Minister for Civil Service, to ban workers at signal intelligence 
headquarters GCHQ from belonging to a trade union. The case stands for the 
proposition that in principle an exercise of prerogative power is reviewable on 
ordinary public law grounds.61 In Lord Diplock’s words: ‘I see no reason why simply 
because a decision-making power is derived from a common law and not a statutory 
source, it should for that reason only be immune from judicial review.’ 62 But in fact, 
what the case gives with one hand it all but takes back with the other, such were the 
riders and qualifications added to the principle. Many prerogatives, the Law Lords 
agreed, were beyond the reach of the judicial process altogether because review of 
their exercise would necessarily involve policy considerations. The best-known 
exclusionary device was Lord Roskill’s list of ‘excluded categories’, that is, those 
prerogatives that were judged by their nature to be unreviewable. The non-
exhaustive list included most of the powers that comprise what I would include in 
the central case of prerogative: ‘the making of treaties, the defence of the realm, the 
prerogative of mercy, the grant of honours, the dissolution of Parliament and the 
appointment of ministers’.63 Certainly, judges and contemporary commentators 
would have expected the core principle to evolve.64 But there is no sign of anything 
more than that the judges might be prepared to nibble around the edges of 
prerogative.  
A review of the post-GCHQ case law a decade ago produced a mixed picture. 
Judicial oversight might have gone further than earlier dicta would have led one to 
expect; but there was still plenty of deference to prerogative on show.65 I argued 
that while there had been a genuine movement in a rule-of-law direction, you more 
often saw the courts performing a ‘prerogative two-step’. Step 1, the refusal to 
countenance the idea of a gap in the normal framework of the law and the assertion 
that ordinary legal principles apply to prerogative law-making; Step 2, the 
accommodation of government interests and equivocation or uncertainty in the 
application of those principles. In other words, courts were disinclined to say that a 
                                                      
60 The previous modern jurisprudence held that the courts would inquire into whether a particular 
prerogative exists or not, and if it does exist, into its extent. But once the existence and extent of a 
power are established, the court cannot inquire into the propriety of its exercise: Attorney General v De 
Keyser’s Royal Hotel Ltd [1920] AC 508. The older authorities go back at least as far as Prohibitions del Roy 
(1608) 12 Co. Rep. 63 and the Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Co. Rep. 74. 
61 See Rahmatullah (No.2) and Serdar Mohamed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 1, discussed below, at [15] 
(Lady Hale): ‘After that case, the exercise of prerogative power might be excluded from the scope of 
judicial review, not because of its source, whether statute or the prerogative, but because of its subject 
matter’. 
62 CCSU, 410. See also Lord Scarman at 407 and Lord Roskill at 417. 
63 CCSU, 418. 
64 See e.g. Simon Lee, ‘GCHQ: Prerogative and Public Law Principles’ [1985] Public Law 186. 
65 Poole, ‘Judicial Review at the Margins: Law, Power and Prerogative’. In that assessment, I was certainly 
not alone. See also e.g. Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), 
133: in no area of public law ‘are the courts as reluctant to review government actions and decisions as 
when they touch upon the prerogative.’ 
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challenge to a prerogative was non-justiciable, but were reluctant to decide against 
the government. Looking back, this was true of GCHQ itself. The court held that 
the exercise of prerogative was in principle reviewable – employees and trade 
unionists had a legitimate expectation of consultation – but that national security 
interests as defined by government took precedence. The government lost on the 
law, so to speak, but still managed to win at the close.  
Many prerogative cases seemed to fit this mould. GCHQ had made inroads 
into prerogative but had left its basic structure for the most part intact. More 
specifically, at one level (corresponding to Step 1) the jurisprudence claimed to 
demystify and normalise prerogative, purporting to treat it as just another executive 
power (albeit one that in some contexts touched upon matters of political 
sensitivity). At another level (corresponding to Step 2), it accepted, often covertly 
or at least quietly, the continued existence of prerogative as a special category of 
executive power that evoked a special authority to which the court ought to defer. 
In the application of the law of prerogative then, there was some evidence to suggest 
the residual pull of the affective dimension of prerogative which, though now denied 
at the level of general principle, had been so long one of its core elements.  
This jurisprudential analysis sat within a broader account of constitutional 
dynamics that contained two key aspects, both with considerable pedigree: the 
shrinking of prerogative, taking place largely at the political level but not only there,66 
typically by turning prerogative into a statutory power;67 and the normalising of 
prerogative that occurs largely at the legal level but not only there, typically by 
subjecting the exercise of prerogative to more searching scrutiny.68 What I did not 
foresee was the pace of change. Examples of shrinkage include putting the right to 
manage the civil service, at issue in GCHQ, on a statutory footing,69 and the 
replacement of the dissolution prerogative through the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 
2011. There have been significant normalising moves within Parliament, notably a 
(nascent) constitutional convention that would require House of Commons 
approval before armed force may be deployed,70 and the increased role for 
Parliament in the exercise of the foreign relations prerogative.71  
                                                      
66 A legal example might be M v Home Office [1994] 1 AC 377.  
67 A process discussed in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 
513. 
68 See e.g. R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Everett [1989] QB 811 (CA), where Taylor LJ 
summarised the effect of the GCHQ case as making clear that the powers of the court ‘cannot be 
ousted merely by invoking the word ‘prerogative’. See also R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex p Al Fayed [1998] 1 WLR 763. 
69 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, Part 1, section 3. 
70 See House of Lords Constitution Committee, Constitutional arrangements for the use of armed force (2nd 
Report of Session 2013-14, July 2013); James Strong, ‘Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing 
the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative through Syria, Libya and Iraq’ (2015) 17 British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations 604; Philippe Lagassé, ‘Parliament and the War Prerogative in the 
United Kingdom and Canada: Explaining Variations in Institutional Change and Legislative Control’ 
(2017) 70 Parliamentary Affairs 280. 
71 See e.g. Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, Part 2 of which enlarges the role for 
Parliament in the process of ratifying treaties and vesting an express power of veto in the House of 
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Significant though some of these developments are, it remains possible to fit 
them into my earlier thesis – that we are witnessing the gradual, if increasingly 
frequent, reduction of prerogative, the assumption being that ultimately this 
normalising process would reduce the category to its hard core. But more recent 
jurisprudential developments question that analysis and make it possible to advance 
a stronger explanatory narrative. They make it plausible to argue, that is to say, that 
prerogative has no discernible core.  
Exemplary in this regard are four cases handed down in the same week by the 
UK Supreme Court (UKSC), all of which touched on foreign relations powers. In 
Miller – the Brexit case – the UKSC upheld the lower court’s decision that the 
government did not have the power under the foreign relations prerogative to give 
notice to the EU institutions of the UK’s intention to withdraw from the EU, since 
to do so would compromise existing statutory rights.72 Much has already been said 
about the case.73 But what is interesting for present purposes is that – contrary to 
the expectations of many commentators, even those like me who thought that the 
government should lose on the law – neither court gave any leeway to the argument 
based on the affective dimension of prerogative, prominent though it was in 
government submissions. This represents a significant defeat for prerogative since 
this was a case decided on one of its strongest grounds – foreign relations being 
unquestionably part of its central case74 – and at the sharp end of governmental 
action. One of the government’s documents claimed that the matter was ‘of high, if 
not the highest, policy; a polycentric decision based upon a multitude of domestic 
and foreign policy and political concerns for which the expertise of Ministers and 
their officials are particularly well suited and the Courts ill-suited.’75 In response, the 
UKSC repeated Lord Reid’s description of prerogative as ‘a relic of a past age’,76 
while being careful not to deny its functional importance as a ministerial power in 
the fields of diplomacy and war.77 The Court was not remotely persuaded that the 
category in itself did any work, holding with clarity and conviction that the functional 
concerns that might be said to support it must be subordinated to the constitutional 
arguments arraigned against it here.78 The judges denied the claim that the 
prerogative as a category reflects or embodies the custodial function of the executive 
in relation to which the court should tread warily, an argument that did have some 
traction among the dissenting judges.79 
                                                      
Commons. See also Campbell McLachlan, Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), chapter 5. 
72 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5. 
73 For more of my own thoughts on the case see Thomas Poole, ‘Devotion to Legalism: On the Brexit 
Case’ (2017) 80 Modern Law Review 696. 
74 Other inroads have been made into the foreign affairs prerogative: see e.g. R (Abbasi) v Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2002] EWCA Civ 1598; R (Al Rawi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2006] EWCA Civ 1279.  
75 ‘Detailed Grounds of Resistance on Behalf of the Secretary of State’ (2 September 2016), s.5(3). 
76 Burmah Oil, 101. 
77 Miller, [49]. 
78 Miller, [92]. 
79 [240] (Lord Reed); [249] (Lord Carnwath).  
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The other three cases, handed down together – Belhaj, Rahmatullah and Serdar 
Mohamed – are less well known but in their own way equally significant. They arise 
out of the post-2001 counterterrorism climate and target specifically the UK’s 
complicity in the unlawful detention and rendition, assault, torture and cruel and 
inhuman treatment of individuals usually (in these actions) at the hands of officials 
of other states. In narrowly doctrinal terms, they engage the category of Act of State, 
a common law doctrine (or set of doctrines) that shelters from judicial oversight 
certain kinds of ‘sovereign’ acts done in the exercise of the foreign relations 
prerogative and the broadly comparable acts of other states.80 Constitutionally 
speaking, we might invoke Locke to suggest that those doctrines are part of the 
federative power and, as such, may be conceived if not as part of the prerogative 
then operating on precisely the same terrain, since both rest in the same hands (the 
executive) and derive their authority from the same source (its capacity as guardian 
of the state). This perspective acknowledges that Act of State is part of domestic 
law not public international law. It also tells us something useful about the legal 
terrain that Act of State is supposed to help map out. In these terms, Act of State 
can be understood as a principle (or set of principles) that is partly constitutive of 
that part of the state which comprehends and acts in the world outside it. As the 
term federative implies – it is centrally about agreements or pacts (foedera) – this 
capacity also has a non-domestic dimension. That is, it also patterns legal relations 
that result principally from the actions of other state agents, but which touch on the 
legal capacities of the state’s own agents. It does so federatively – that is, as though 
it expects those patterns to be mirrored or replicated in the legal systems of other 
states (although that may or not be the case in practice, and is not determinative 
either way). In other words, the federative is unique among domestic constitutional 
capacities in that it deals with projections of juridical authority from the outside in 
as well as the inside out.  
The first case, Belhaj, engaged the foreign act of state doctrine.81 As such, it is an 
example precisely of the distinctive outside-in operation of the federative just 
remarked upon. The central issue was UK complicity in actions in relation to which 
foreign states (in Belhaj’s case, the US and Libya) were the prime actors. The 
government argued that the court should recognise a broad category of foreign acts 
of state that covered all sovereign acts by a foreign state. The Supreme Court refused 
to expand the existing categories recognised by the common law – and rejected a 
parallel international law claim of state immunity – although what those categories 
are now meant to look like varies from judge to judge. All the judges accepted, 
                                                      
80 For an authoritative analysis see Amanda Perreau-Saussine, ‘British Acts of State in English Courts’ 
(2008) 78 British Year Book of International Law 176. There have been important recent Australian 
jurisprudence on the Act of State doctrine: Habib v Commonwealth [2010] FCACA 12; Moti v The Queen 
[2011] 245 CLR 456, where French CJ for the majority held that there was no ‘general and universally 
applicable rule that Australian courts may not be required (or do not have or may not exercise 
jurisdiction) to form a view about the lawfulness of conduct that occurred outside Australia by 
reference to foreign law’ (para 50).  
81 Belhaj and Rahmatullah v Jack Straw [2017] UKSC 3. 
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however, that there were certain acts – torture certainly among them – that could 
receive no protection from the Act of State doctrine.82 ‘The purpose of the foreign 
act of state doctrine is to preclude challenges to the legality or validity of the 
sovereign acts of foreign states. It is not to protect English parties from liability for 
their role in it.’83 
Lord Neuberger seems to attract the most support, although Lord Mance’s is 
arguably the leading judgment. What is clear is that the Court rejected the contention 
that UK courts were precluded ‘from investigating any acts of a foreign state when 
and if the Foreign Office communicated the Government’s view that such 
investigation would “embarrass” the United Kingdom in its international 
relations’.84 (Although such a statement might be a factor a court would take into 
account when deciding whether to refuse to determine the issue.85) That position 
came with a wider rejection of the straightforward equation between the exercise of 
sovereignty and the executive branch of the state, not just in the UK but more 
widely:  
 
In states subject to the rule of law, a state’s sovereignty may be manifest 
through its legislative, executive or judicial branches acting within their 
respective spheres … A rule of recognition which treats any executive act by 
the government of a foreign state as valid, irrespective of its legality under the 
law of the foreign state … could mean ignoring, rather than giving effect to, 
the way in which a state’s sovereignty is expressed.86 
 
This is an important statement. It insists that the starting proposition within a 
constitutional state such as the UK must be that federative power is exercised on 
the basis of legality (or constitutionality) and not on the basis of prerogative (or 
sovereignty).  This proposition only has direct bearing on UK law, of course, but as 
I said earlier it is a characteristic of the federative that it operates on the assumption 
that other similar legal orders will mirror or replicate the legal structure of the 
federative that is being articulated here. This statement does from the outside – and 
rather more boldly – something that Miller does from within. It dismantles the 
worldview that sustains the domestic prerogative in a strong sense, that is, the 
prerogative understood as an imperative and directive constitutional power. That 
view of the prerogative, when externalised and generalised, fits a model in which 
sovereign entities interact on the basis of their presumed imperative authority. 
                                                      
82 [98] (Lord Mance); [168] (Lord Neuberger); [262] (Lord Sumption). 
83 [266] (Lord Sumption), distinguishing R (Noor Khan) v Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [2014] EWCA 
Civ 24. 
84 [41] (Lord Mance); [241] (Lord Sumption), interpreting Buttes Gas and Oil Co. v Hammer (No.3) [1982] 
AC 1988. The government relied in particular on Yukos v Rosneft Oil Co. (No.2) [2012] EWCA Civ 855.  
85 [149] (Lord Neuberger). Another important diplomatic relations case, albeit arising in a different 
context with different arguments in play, is R (Corner House) v Director of Serious Fraud Office [2008] 
UKHL 60, where arguments about necessity and national security did trump the rule of law.  
86 [65] (Lord Mance). Also [167] (Lord Neuberger).  
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Instead, the UKSC in Belhaj insists upon a standard for the UK’s interaction with 
other legal orders that corresponds to the UK constitution’s own principles.  
The second Act of State case, Al-Waheed, concerned an action for damages 
against the UK government this time alleging unlawful detention and maltreatment 
by British forces.87 The first question concerned whether the UK had authority 
under relevant UN Security Council resolutions to adopt its own detention policy, 
above and beyond that already established in Afghanistan under the aegis of the 
International Security Assistance Force. The Court held that it did.88 A second issue 
related to the applicability of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
to extraterritorial armed conflict. On this matter, the majority preferred the decision 
of the Grand Chamber in Hassan v United Kingdom over its earlier judgment in Al-
Skeini.89 In Hassan, the European Court of Human Rights rejected the argument that 
Article 5 (the right to liberty) was displaced in such contexts, but held that it fell to 
be adapted to a context in which international humanitarian law provided the 
relevant safeguards against abuse.90 Applied to the situation in Al-Waheed, the UKSC 
found the detention processes deficient on the narrow basis that it failed to provide 
an adequate and practical means by which those detained could challenge the legality 
of their detention.91 The UK was therefore in breach of its obligations under ECHR 
Article 5(4). 
There is considerable nuance here, as the UKSC tried to grapple with what is 
an almost intractable predicament. The relevant context is where, pursuant to the 
exercise of armed force, a signatory to the ECHR has gained some foothold, 
necessarily incomplete, within a foreign territory. In that context, it is likely to be 
impossible to guarantee the whole gamut of Convention rights. Does that mean that 
the only alternative is in effect the disapplication of those rights? Both options have 
considerable drawbacks. In line with the consistent disinclination in these cases to 
allow for legal black holes,92 the Court preferred an approach that insisted that a 
core set of rights must apply in extra-territorial conflicts and – equally important – 
that those rights are made meaningful to those who seek to engage them.93 The case 
was decided largely within the framework of European and international human 
rights law.94 Even so, Al-Waheed manages to exemplify what now seems normal 
                                                      
87 Al-Waheed and Serdar Mohamed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 2. 
88 [38] (Lord Sumption). In reaching this conclusion, the UKSC also worked through important points 
about authorisation in international law, distinguishing the ECtHR’s judgment in Al-Jedda v United 
Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 23. Lord Mance dissented on this point: [180]. 
89 Al-Skeini v United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 18.  
90 Hassan v United Kingdom (2014) 38 EHRC 358. Lord Reed (Lord Kerr in agreement) dissented on this 
point.  
91 [105-6] (Lord Sumption).  
92 See e.g. Belhaj, [30] (Lord Mance): ‘The appellants’ case on state immunity in this jurisdiction would 
preclude suit against them anywhere.’ 
93 [67] (Lord Sumption).  
94 [148] (Lord Mance): ‘the intermeshing of domestic and international law issues and law has been 
increasingly evident in recent years. Just as States answer for domestic courts in international law, so it 
is possible to regard at least some domestic court decisions as elements of the practice of States, or as 
ways through which States may express their opinio juris regarding the rules of international law.’  
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when it comes to judging activities within the prerogative/federative zone, where 
the urge to normalise and juridify is paramount and yet there is still sensitivity in the 
application of the (new) legal standards to often difficult operational contexts. 
The third case, Serdar Mohamed, concerned extensive periods of detention of 
those initially captured by British forces in Iraq before being handed over to the 
United States.95 This part of the action related to the UK’s own treatment of those 
detained, as opposed to its complicity with other states that was the issue in Belhaj, 
and so engaged the Crown (or domestic) Act of State doctrine. Building on 
admittedly ‘shaky foundations’,96 Lady Hale in the leading judgment acknowledged 
the existence of a ‘rule that certain decisions of high policy in the conduct of foreign 
affairs are non-justiciable’.97 She continued, applying the rule to the context before 
her: ‘if act of state is a defence to the use of lethal force in the conduct of military 
operations abroad, it must also be a defence to the capture and detention of persons 
on imperative grounds of security in the conduct of such operations. It makes no 
sense to permit killing but not capture and detention, the military then being left 
with the invidious choice between killing the enemy or letting him go.’98 
So far so prerogative-minded, one might say. ‘It is necessary that the courts 
continue to recognise that there are some acts of a governmental nature, committed 
abroad, upon which the courts in England and Wales will not pass judgment.’99 But 
there is a sting in the tail. Emphasising the need to keep domestic act of state within 
very narrow bounds,100 Lady Hale concluded: 
 
We are left with a very narrow class of acts: in their nature sovereign acts – the 
sorts of thing that governments properly do; committed abroad; in the conduct 
of the foreign policy of the state; so closely connected to that policy to be necessary in 
pursuing it; and at least extending to the conduct of military operations which 
are themselves lawful in international law[.]101 
 
We need to examine carefully what is going on here. This is an ostensible win for 
the government – the only win in the quartet of cases examined so far. But it is really 
(or also) another example of normalisation. On one hand, the Supreme Court 
appears to accept a category of executive acts that escape the jurisdiction of the 
court. And yet almost in the same breath, the Court subjects that category to scrutiny 
that contains most of the core features of proportionality or irrationality review.102 
                                                      
95 Rahmatullah (No.2) and Serdar Mohamed v Ministry of Defence [2017] UKSC 1. 
96 The only real authority here was Buron v Denman (1848) 2 Exch 167, in which the court shielded 
Captain Denman from an action for damages for liberating slaves in West Africa.  
97 [31]. 
98 [33]. 
99 [33].  
100 [33]. 
101 [37], emphasis added. Compare Lord Sumption at [81], which seems to strip the test of some of its 
proportionality-like features.  
102 Irrationality review has been considerably strengthened of late: see e.g. Pham v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2015] UKSC 19; Keyu; R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21; Kennedy v Charity 
Commission [2014] UKSC 20. The difference between the new irrationality and proportionality (and 
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In order to obtain the protection that this Act of State principle affords, the 
government must show a legitimate aim and it must not only connect the impugned 
measures to that aim but also show that they were necessary to achieve that aim. 
The last limb of that test in particular is no trivial hurdle. In any case, the test is 
identical to that applied to assess the legality of any significant executive decision or 
action.  
 
 
V. GENERAL EXECUTIVE POWERS 
 
I have argued that the prerogative in its true sense ought to be understood as a special 
category of executive power that evoked a special authority to which the court ought to defer (the 
central case). We might say that the initial post-GCHQ cases modified that 
understanding somewhat, so that prerogative came to be seen as a special category 
of executive power that evoked a special authority to which the court ought in 
appropriate cases to defer. But what might one say now, in light of the quartet of recent 
cases just examined, as well as the other developments referenced earlier? The 
moderate reading would suggest a further modification from the original position, 
so we might say that prerogative has now become a special category of executive 
power that may evoke a special authority to which the court may in appropriate cases 
defer.103 The stronger reading presses the point further so that redefinition becomes 
deconstruction: prerogative is no special category, just an inchoate set of executive 
capacities to which deference in general terms ought not to be given. 
It may not matter all that much whether the moderate or the stronger 
interpretation of the prerogative is right. But one difference between them may be 
that if the courts elect the stronger position over the more moderate one, the harder 
it is going to be for the executive to get traction in prerogative cases. The reason is 
simple. Whereas the moderate reading still permits deference, the stronger reading 
makes deference exceptional and marginal. Underlying this is a minor, but 
significant difference. The stronger reading presses more vigorously what we might 
call the claims of constitutional normality. It insists with fewer reservations than the 
                                                      
reasonableness) tests is not clear; but the dominant school of thought is that whereas proportionality is 
tethered to the presence of a right or rights, irrationality is the test to apply where no right is engaged.  
103 Supporters of this view might care to reference the Court of Appeal decision Regina (XH and Another) v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA Civ 4, an unsuccessful challenge to the Home 
Secretary’s use of the prerogative to withdraw passports from those suspected of terrorist links. The 
Court of Appeal held (distinguishing Miller) that the prerogative in this area had not been entirely 
displaced by terrorism prevention and investigation measures (‘TPIMs’) conferred on the Home 
Secretary by the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011. Note, however, that the 
category of prerogative is doing no work; it is the reason of state argument that is load-bearing. See 
especially [116]: ‘We accept that the fundamental nature of the rights involved in the present case gives 
rise to a need for a strong justification for any interference. However, we consider that such a 
justification is clearly made out here. The grounds relied on by the Secretary of State [including in 
closed proceedings] demonstrate a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to a vital national 
interest.’ 
 
 
Thomas Poole                                The Strange Death of Prerogative in England  
 
 21 
alternative that any special authority claimed by the executive ought to be sourced 
through more legitimate forms of legal authority – statute principally,104 but also in 
the federative context (positive) international law.105 Either way, it may be time to 
stop talking about prerogative altogether. The term obscures more than it elucidates 
– but then again it has done that for a long time. We should update our legal 
categories to match our constitutional thinking. Just as we now speak about the 
executive’s general administrative powers as opposed to prerogatives of contract 
and agency, so too should we ditch prerogative and talk instead about the general 
executive powers of government.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
104 The same principle lay at the heart of Al-Rawi v The Security Service [2011] UKSC 34. 
105 As somewhat shakily displayed in Al-Waheed. See also the discussion on sources of legal authority and 
the UK Constitution in Miller, discussed in Poole, ‘Devotion to Legalism’. 
